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Abstract
Individual differences in perception and in social cognition are products of both biology 
and cultural experience.  Many of the same differences that typify autism when they occur 
in extremes also underlie normal human cognitive variation when they occur to more subtle 
degrees.  In particular, autism spectrum conditions are characterised by low degrees of two 
linked  capacities:  level  of  construal,  meaning  the  tendency  to  represent  percepts  as 
individual details rather than as whole contexts; and  psychological distance,  meaning the 
tendencies to perceive objects and events in distant rather than peri-personal space, to recall 
or  to  anticipate  past  or  future  time rather  than  the  here-and-now,  to  approach  social 
interactions in the allocentric frame of other people rather than one's own egocentric frame, 
and to represent hypothetical, counterfactual, or fictional beliefs that are at odds with actual 
facts.   Significantly,  culture  also  exerts  linked  effects  on  level  of  construal  and 
psychological distance, which are relatively increased in more contextual, socially focussed 
cultures and decreased in more individualistic, self-focussed cultures.  A question for cross-
cultural  psychological  research,  then,  is  how  might  lifelong  exposure  to  South  Asian 
cultures,  in contrast  to North American or European cultures,  modify the phenotype of 
Asperger syndrome, and in general the phenotypes of those individuals at or just beyond 
the  mild  end  of  the  autism spectrum.   This  mild  extreme is  the  most  likely  locus  of 
difference, as individuals with mild Asperger syndrome or the “broader autism phenotype” 
are  not  immediately  visibly  abnormal,  and  therefore  are  more  easily  accepted  by  the 
surrounding  society,  interact  more  with  it,  and  are  more  effectively  influenced  by  it. 
Furthermore, when their social communicative deficits do become manifest, the resulting 
social disabilities may be to some extent scaffolded and filled in by a surrounding society in 
which many social goals and relationships are explicit and algorithmic rather than implicit 
and underspecified.  The relationship between autism-spectrum severity and the effects of a 
social-contextually  focussed  culture  may  be  a  parabolic  one,  with  increased  social 
scaffolding ameliorating the autistic phenotype at the mild end of the spectrum and social 
exclusion aggravating it at the severe end.  Perhaps most significantly, gender roles may 
interact with Asperger syndrome, in an environment in which less empathising and social 
communicative  skill  is  demanded  of  males,  and  females  with  deficits  in  these  social 
cognitive domains therefore are placed at an inordinate disadvantage.  Our current work is 
exploring  these  questions  and  theses,  using  both  questionnaire  and  experimental 
behavioural  measures  to  assay  perception,  attention,  executive  function  and  social 
cognition, both in individuals with Asperger syndrome and in clinically unaffected family 
members with high loadings for the broader autism phenotype.
1. Autism in India
In  a  very  short  span  of  years,  autism  has  leapt  to  the  awareness  not  only  of  Indian  child  development 
professionals but also the Indian public.  As India's culture is very much reflected in – and in turn shaped by – its 
media, it's  perhaps no surprise now to see autism featuring on the daily television programme  Aapki Antara 
whose title character is an autistic girl, or to see Shahrukh Khan portraying Asperger syndrome in the cinema hit 
My Name Is Khan.  Significantly, these Indian narratives construe autism within a more social frame than do 
Western accounts:  What is the effect of autism on family and personal relationships?  What can people with 
autism spectrum conditions teach us about the way we relate to each other and to the world around us?  This is a 
point of view that has been largely missed out by the highly medicalised study of autism in North America, 
Europe  and  the  UK.   Bringing  scientific  scrutiny  of  autism  together  with  a  quintessentially  Indian  social 
awareness of autism will create an understanding from which Indian and non-Indian science and cultures can 
benefit.
Our and others' work during the past two decades has helped form the basis of a current theory of autism 
as a perturbation of neural connectivity – that is, the ways in which individual neurones and groups of neurones 
transfer information amongst themselves (Brock et al., 2002; Belmonte et al., 2004a; Müller et al., 2011).  The 
central notion is that perturbations of connectivity within local neural networks – either surfeits or deficits of 
cells, synapses, excitatory/inhibitory ratio, or neuromodulatory activity (Belmonte & Bourgeron, 2006) – cause a 
decrease  in  local  network  entropy,  which  then  hamstrings  activity-dependent  development  of  long-range 
connections that support cognitive integration, cognitive flexibility, and centralised cognitive control (Belmonte 
et al.,  2004b).  Supporting this notion, and extending it from the pathological to the normal range of human 
neurophysiological  and  cognitive  variation,  recent  findings  show that  disrupted  excitatory/inhibitory  balance 
lowers  local  network  entropy  in  animal  models  (Shew  et  al.,  2011),  and  that  individual  variations  in  local 
network entropy within brain regions translate developmentally into individual differences in long-range transfer 
of information between brain regions (Vakorin et al., 2011).  The more closely we examine the subtleties of such 
differences in neural wiring, the more we find that they underlie not only clinical disease states such as autism, 
but also human difference and diversity in general.  In this guise, when we study autism we really are studying 
human  cognitive  diversity,  and  by  understanding  autism  we  can  gain  a  deeper  understanding  of  humanity 
(Belmonte, 2008, 2011).
2. The autism spectrum and human cognitive diversity
“Autism” spans a broad array of phenotypes, and the saying (popularised by Stephen Shore) amongst special-
education teachers and other autism professionals  and caregivers is  “If  you've seen one person with autism, 
you've  seen  one person  with  autism.”   Autism  is  defined  clinically  by  deficits  in  social  interaction, 
communication,  and  behavioural  and  cognitive  flexibility  (American  Psychiatric  Association,  2000).   These 
general classifications, though, are quite broad: a deficit in social interaction might be as subtle as a decreased 
repertoire of pretend play or as pronounced as a total inability to play socially; a deficit in communication might 
manifest as an inability to jump into fast-moving conversation at a party or as a total inability to speak; restricted 
and repetitive behaviours might be as abstract as the case of a child with Asperger syndrome who spends all her 
time programming computers or as concrete as a the case of a child with autism who spends all his time gazing at 
a spinning fan or flicking a light switch on and off.
How is it that a single clinical condition can come in so many varieties?  We know that autism is strongly 
influenced by genes (Belmonte & Bourgeron, 2006), and by their interaction with environmental and experiential 
factors.  Amongst monozygotic twins, if one twin is autistic there is a 60% chance that the other twin will be 
autistic  too,  and  a  90%  chance  that  the  other  twin  will  be  somewhere  on  the  “autism  spectrum”  which 
encompasses autism and milder variants such as Asperger syndrome.  Key to understanding this highly variable 
phenotype is the recognition that autism arises not just from one or a few genes, but from many interacting genes, 
each of which can be mutated or modified in many ways.  In this regard autistic cognitive traits are a bit like skin 
colour: each is strongly genetically influenced, but each comes in a diversity of shades.
Recent work in our laboratory and others has begun to show that this spectrum of variation in autistic 
personality  and  cognitive  traits  extends  beyond the  clinical  autism spectrum, and underlies  much of  human 
cognitive diversity.  Autism can be characterised as a deficit in “empathising,” that is, the ability to understand 
others' emotions and to respond in kind, along with a surfeit of “systemising,” that is, the ability to understand 
and to predict the behaviour of physical or logical systems that act according to deterministic rules (Baron-
Cohen, 2002).  Occupations that attract high systemisers include science and engineering; those that attract high 
empathisers include counselling, marketing, and diplomacy.  Measures of empathising and systemising in the 
general population show that these traits are partly heritable (Constantino & Todd, 2003, 2005; Ronald et al., 
2006), and that high systemising is more common amongst the family members of people with autism (Baron-
Cohen et al.,  1997),  and autism is  slightly  more common amongst the family members  of high systemisers 
(Baron-Cohen, 1998).  Importantly, the distribution of these traits throughout the general population is unimodal; 
there is no empirically discernible dividing line between a person with mild autism or Asperger syndrome and an 
extreme-normal individual on the high end of normal systemising and the low end of normal empathising.  These 
population data again show that the same set of genetic variations and environmental interactions that gives us 
autism also gives us a wealth of human cognitive diversity – and in many senses, people with autism can be 
described as “human, but more so” (Belmonte, 2008); that is, they carry the same cognitive traits that all of us do, 
except to greater degree.
Starting from this recognition of humanity's essential connectedness to autism, we have studied normal 
human cognitive variation by applying to non-autistic people some of the same experimental tools developed to 
measure  cognitive  skills  in  people  with autism.   We were interested in  the question of  whether  strength  at 
systemising tends always to come along with weakness at empathising, as it does in autism, or whether in the 
broader population, beyond the autism spectrum, these traits might be independent of each other.  The answer, we 
found (Valla et al., 2010) – at least in the American culture from which we sampled – depends on sex: men who 
are good systemisers tend to be poor empathisers, whereas many women are strong at both empathising and 
systemising independently.  Men seem to compensate for such deficits in empathising by applying systemising 
skills to problems of empathy - for example,  in men but not in women, the  systemising ability to analyse a 
geometric figure in detail is associated with the  empathising ability to recognise faces.  Furthermore, in male 
undergraduates, being in a highly systemising field of study (e.g. maths or physics as opposed to government or 
literature)  is  more  closely  related  to  weak  empathising  skills  than  to  strong  systemising  skills,  whereas  in 
undergraduate women,  systemising fields are more related to strong systemising abilities - so it seems that when 
it comes to selecting an occupation men's choices may be determined more by their weaknesses than by their 
strengths!  (It's crucial to note that all these relationships exist not necessarily for individual men and women, but 
rather describe in very broad strokes the whole population of men and the whole population of women.)
This collection of our and others' findings on the relation of autism to cognitive diversity ought to pose a 
caution for biomedical efforts towards a cure for autism.  Autism is its severest forms, in which people are largely 
unable to interact  with society or even to speak,  is  unequivocally  a disease and a proper  object of medical 
scrutiny.  In the case of milder variants on the autism spectrum, though, the difficulty may be at least as much a 
flaw in society as it is any shortcoming in the individual: a culture's inability to appreciate the skills and to 
accommodate the cognitive and social style of people with autism spectrum conditions is a failing of that culture, 
and not of the individual.  This recognition of the significance of cultural environment in the outcome for people 
with mild autism spectrum conditions, or even extreme-normal levels of autistic traits,  sets the stage for the 
discussion following.
3. Autism's interaction with culture
To what extent is autistic behaviour a property of the individual, and to what extent is it determined in interaction 
with the culture in which that individual is immersed?  Different cultures focus more or less on analytical, detail-
oriented understanding of things-in-themselves and social framing of persons as independent individuals, versus 
holistic  understanding  of  things-in-context  and  social  framing  of  people  as  members  of  social  groups  and 
relationships.   This  axis  of  variation  between  individualistic,  detail-oriented  Western  cultures  and  societal, 
context-oriented Asian cultures is relevant because an essential feature of autism is a cognitive bias towards 
details and individuals, and away from contexts and groups.   How might lifelong exposure to one or another 
culture either accentuate or mollify this cognitive phenotype of autism?
Autism has been characterised as a weakness of “central coherence” (Frith & Happé, 1994) – in Frith's 
terms, “the tendency to draw together diverse information to construct higher-level meaning in context.”  This 
description is consistent with autistic superiorities at tasks that exercise local, detailed-oriented rather than global, 
contextual processing, as measured by the skill of people with autism at the Embedded Figures Test (Shah & 
Frith, 1983), the Wechsler Block Design subtest (Shah & Frith, 1993) and other tasks of perceptual disembedding 
(Plaisted et al., 1998; Mottron et al., 2003).  In addition to these autistic superiorities at low-level encoding or 
analysis,  weak  central  coherence  describes  autistic  deficits at  essentially  contextual  tasks  such  as  narrative 
comprehension.  A perennial difficulty, though, has been the relation of these  non-social perceptual aspects of 
weak central  coherence  to  autism's  social deficits,  which  are  its  most  evident,  most  debilitating,  and  most 
diagnostic symptoms.  It's easy for the concept of weak central coherence to describe the child who incessantly 
spins the wheels on a toy car – but how can weak coherence also describe that same child's inability to join in 
pretend  play  with  a  group  of  peers?   Recent  work  outside  of  autism research  links  social  and  non-social 
perception and cognition, showing that the way we respond to people has much to do with the way we respond to 
things, and that culture therefore can be a powerful determinant of both social and non-social cognition.
The concept of  psychological distance (Liberman & Trope, 2008; Trope & Liberman, 2010) links four 
general areas of perception and cognition all  of  which are perturbed in autism: children with autism can be 
delayed in developing the spatial ability to refer (e.g. by pointing) to objects that do not occupy immediate, peri-
personal  space;  or  the  temporal ability  to  refer  to  a  memorable happening or to  look forward to  a  planned 
occasion; or the social ability to take the perspective or to “put oneself in the shoes of” another person; or the 
ability to attribute or to maintain  hypothetical  or counterfactual beliefs or fictional accounts.  (In fact each of 
these scenarios is addressed by at least one question in the Autism Diagnostic Interview – Revised (Lord et al., 
1994), one of the standard diagnostic instruments for autism.)  In the same way that we can speak of a long way, 
a long time, long odds, or a long gap between social classes, these spatial,  temporal, hypothetical and social 
forms of distance may share neural representations (Bueti & Walsh, 2009; Boroditsky, 2000).  The ability to see 
objects, events or people mainly as they relate statically to each other, rather than as they relate currently to 
oneself and one's vantage at this moment, depends on a brain that can transform proximal, egocentric percepts to 
more distal, allocentric representations (Frith & de Vignemont, 2005).  This difference between egocentric detail 
and abstract context is termed by Trope “level of construal” – and it is exactly the same property that Frith has 
termed “central  coherence.”   Trope's  construal  level  theory is  the  missing social/non-social  link  that  autism 
researchers have been looking for: it joins social distance to perceptual distance under a common neuro-cognitive 
mechanism, by relating both to level of construal.   And very significantly for cross-cultural perspectives on 
autism, level of construal is profoundly affected not only by autism, but also by culture.
This  psychological  and  cultural  relationship  between  physical  distance  on  the  one  hand  and  social 
distance on the other is familiar to anyone who's had the experience of walking into, say, the Gimme Coffee on 
Mott Street in Manhattan versus, say, the Indian Coffee House on College Street in Kolkata.  In New York where 
the physical space remains a property of the individual rather than the group, to join a stranger's table (i.e. to enter 
their  social space) and to begin conversation without asking or receiving an explicit social invitation would be 
uncouth.  In Kolkata, at  least  in some circumstances, it  might be uncouth  not to join!  And it's  exactly this 
transmission and reception of invitations to  initiate social  interaction (Müller et  al.,  2008) that can pose the 
greatest obstacle for people with autism spectrum conditions, who all too often find themselves either having 
butted in uninvited or having ignored an overture.  In an environment in which physical and social spaces are 
allocentric, invitations become less crucial, and people with Asperger syndrome may find it easier to initiate 
social contact.
A bevy of experiments has shown that manipulating or priming one form of psychological distance or 
level of construal exerts corresponding effects on other forms.  Subjects respond more quickly to stimuli that are 
congruent across types of psychological distance (e.g. the word “today” or “us” or “certain” presented in the 
foreground, or “next year” or “them” or “maybe” presented in the distance) (Bar-Anan et al., 2007), and they tend 
to use more polite, socially distant terms when writing for a temporally distant (future) audience or for a spatially 
distant person (Stephan et al., 2010).  In the Navon task of global-local visual perception – a task oft applied to 
demonstrate local-over-global perceptual bias in autism (Plaisted et al., 1999) – subjects primed by writing about 
what they'll be doing tomorrow (temporal proximity) are more biased perceive small  spatial details faster than 
those who've written about what they'll be doing next year (Trope & Liberman, 2010), and vice versa, subjects 
primed  for  global  perception  exhibit  greater  positive  bias  in  estimates  of  spatial,  temporal,  social,  and 
hypothetical distances (Liberman & Förster, 2009).  The categories into which people group objects are fewer, 
broader and more inclusive (higher in construal, or more centrally coherent) when those objects are imagined in 
the far  future than in the near future,  and social  interactions as portrayed by animated geometric shapes are 
grouped into fewer, longer scenes when they're framed as taking place in a faraway rather than a nearby location 
(Liberman et al., 2002).  In an acute demonstration of the link between social and non-social construal, reading 
personal plural (“we”)  narratives versus singular  (“I”) narratives heightens the congruence effect  in a visual 
flanker task (presumably by broadening attention across the flanking stimuli, making them more distracting), and 
also speeds responses to global targets in the Navon task (Lin & Han, 2009).  The existence of these relationships 
amongst  social  and  non-social  types  of  psychological  distance  suggests  that  the  social  influence  of  cultural 
experience may modify fundamental perceptual processes that extend to both social and non-social cognition.
Thus  far,  cross-cultural  experiments  on  construal  have  included  East  Asians,  North  Americans  and 
Europeans but not, in general, South Asians.  Nor have they included people with autism spectrum conditions or 
other cognitively atypical individuals.  Those results that do exist are suggestive for these groups.  Westerners, as 
Nisbett and Masuda (2003; see also Markus & Kitayama, 1991) summarise, “are inclined to attend to some focal 
object,  analyzing its attributes and categorizing it in an effort to find out what rules govern its behaviour” – 
translating this description into the terms of Baron-Cohen, Western culture promotes and develops systemising. 
In a change-blindness task, in which two similar scenes are presented and subjects must detect a subtle change 
between one scene and the next, North Americans more often and more quickly detect changes in focal objects, 
whereas East Asians are better  at  detecting changes in the background or context within which an object is 
presented (Masuda & Nisbett, 2006; Boduroglu et al., 2009) – and this difference in attentional focus corresponds 
to cultural differences in the targets  of gaze fixation (Chua et  al.,  2005),  just  as autistic attention to minute 
features of objects corresponds to gaze patterns (Klin et al., 2003).  Even in as purely visual, non-social a task as 
perceiving straight lines, North Americans practise more disembedding and less contextualisation: they're less 
distracted by the position of a surrounding frame where the frame is irrelevant to judging a line's orientation, and 
more  impaired  by  failure  to  account  for  the  frame when judging  the  line's  relative  length  (Ji  et  al.,  2000; 
Kitayama et al., 2003).  These differences in perceptual traits are mirrored in relative levels of prefrontal cortical 
activation (Hedden et al., 2008), just as is the case for differences in autistic perceptual traits (Belmonte et al., 
2010).  In a categorisation task, contrasting East Asians to North Americans reproduces the same broadening of 
categories (Norenzayan et al., 2002) that is induced by psychological distance.  Many of these effects of culture 
on perception  and attention  are  far  from subtle,  with  magnitudes  almost  one  standard  deviation  (Nisbett  & 
Miyamoto, 2005).
Several  results  on  the  relationship  between  level  of  construal  and  psychological  distance  in  typical 
persons mirror well known characteristics of autism.  As psychological distance decreases, typical individuals 
become more likely to apply pictorial rather than linguistic representations (Amit et al., 2009), mimicking the 
autistic tendency to think in pictures (or in general in veridical perceptual terms); they become less able to inhibit 
behaviours guided by immediate, low-construal goals versus superordinate, high-construal goals (Fujita et al., 
2006), mimicking autistic difficulties with behavioural control;  and in negotiations they become less able to 
compromise on subordinate goals  in order to attain superordinate goals (Henderson et  al.,  2006), mimicking 
autistic inflexibility (and also recapitulating a North American cultural tendency to take sides in interpersonal 
conflicts (Peng & Nisbett, 1999)).  Along the same lines, novel events – which are in a sense counterfactual 
against a background of common events, and thus more psychologically distant from the perceiver – facilitate 
global,  high-construal  over  local,  low-construal  representations  (Förster  et  al.,  2009),  potentially  linking  the 
autistic aversion to novelty to the autistic perceptual bias for local details over global contexts.
4. A Research Agenda
All these effects of culture on the same perceptual and cognitive domains that are affected by autism suggest that 
independent  (prototypically  Western)  cultures  may  synergise with  autistic  traits  whereas  interdependent 
(prototypically Asian) cultures may counter autistic traits.  This realisation motivates the following theses:
• Lifelong experience of a South Asian, more interdependent culture may in itself constitute a behavioural 
intervention for autism, a sort of training both for non-social attention to context and for social attention 
to intersubjective engagement.  Social relations, in particular, may constitute an important case of such 
training: South Asian social networks are more highly prescribed and constrained, with well defined roles 
and relations.  As such, South Asian social systems may not only help train individuals to attend to social 
context, but also may be more forgiving for those individuals who are less socially competent: when one's 
role  is  socially  defined  and scripted,  the  social  structure  itself  can  support  and  scaffold  one's  social 
activities.  Paradoxically in a way, in this scenario it would be the West's very individualism and relative 
absence of social prescription that would scupper the attempts of people with Asperger syndrome at social 
engagement: where there is no prescribed social role or script to follow, it becomes impossible for the 
social  system  itself  to  constrain  social  interaction,  and  the  individual  is  therefore  lost  in  an  over-
abundance of social choices and decisions.
• This effect of culture is not necessarily the same for mild versus severe degrees of autistic cognitive 
variation.  In fact, the relationship between autism's initial severity and the effect of culture on its outcome 
may be  a  parabolic  one:   Those  on  the  mild  end of  the  autism spectrum,  whose  very  subtle  social 
communicative and other behavioural abnormalities do not render them immediately visibly abnormal, 
may be readily accepted and scaffolded by a socially focussed culture, leading to a less impaired outcome, 
whereas those on the severe end may be just as efficiently ostracised and shunned by it, leading to a more 
impaired outcome.  Along the same lines, cultural influences may be most visible not within the autism 
spectrum  but  rather  just  beyond  it,  in  individuals  who  manifest  the  “broader  autism  phenotype,”  a 
collection of subclinical, dimensional autistic traits that often manifests in relatives of people with autism 
spectrum conditions (Piven et al., 1997; Dawson et al., 2002).  It is perhaps a feature of the very cultural 
scaffolding  that  we address  that  such mild  levels  of  autistic  traits  do  not  generally  come to  clinical 
attention in India: ascertainment and recruitment, therefore, may be difficult, and might most efficiently 
proceed via screening of undiagnosed family members of people with autism spectrum conditions.  Such 
family studies must be approached with tact and care, and an emphasis on the theoretical viewpoint that 
some of the same genetic variants that can contribute to autism also can contribute to beneficial cognitive 
traits such as those underlying scientific or engineering skill.  Thus studies of family members of people 
with autism may have much to say about cross-cultural variation, and should be undertaken.
• Sex differences, too, may vary across cultures: South Asian males under cultural influence may be more 
likely than their North American counterparts to close the typical male gap between empathising and 
systemising; that is, one could predict an uncoupling of empathising from systemising in the South Asian 
male population relative to the North American male population.  In a complementary effect, South Asia's 
more rigid gender roles may be less forgiving of low empathising in females, so that low-empathising 
females may receive less scaffolding than do high-empathising females, accentuating the spread between 
the low and high ends of the female continuum.  Study of cognitive sex differences within and between 
typical male and female populations, and within and between males and females with Asperger syndrome 
or the broader autism phenotype, thus will be informative.
• Studies across cultures and studies across cognitive types offer ways to examine the relation between 
psychological  distance  and  level  of  construal  with  long-term  experiential  rather  than  short-term 
experimental  manipulations,  and  across  cultural  or  cognitive  groups  rather  than  within  individuals. 
Individuals who have developed within a culture emphasising interdependence can be contrasted to those 
from a more  independent culture.  Likewise, individuals who have various “set points” as to level of 
construal and level of social competence – those who are high-construal or low-construal, and those who 
are high-empathising or low-empathising – can be contrasted.
The  ability  to  explore  these  questions  cross-culturally  depends  on  the  availability  of  culturally  appropriate, 
quantitative assessments that control for cultural variability whilst leaving intact the cognitive effects of exposure 
to this variability, and that are able directly or indirectly to quantify the underlying biological factors separately 
from the outcome variables which are an interaction of biology and culture.  Although such explorations would 
have been difficult even a few years ago, they are becoming more and more possible.  Subjects can be assayed for 
systemising and empathising skills using several measures that have been applied in our and others' studies of 
normal  and  pathological  cognitive  variation,  including  the  Autism Spectrum Quotient  (Baron-Cohen  et  al., 
2001b), a self-report measure of positive-systemising and negative-empathising autistic traits (Hoekstra et al., 
2008) which has been validated across British and Japanese cultures (Wakabayashi et al.,  2007b); the Social 
Responsiveness Scale, a  peer-report measure of autistic social traits (Constantino et al., 2003) which has been 
validated in American and German populations (Bölte et  al.,  2008)  though not yet in Asia; a computerised, 
forced-choice  version  of  the  Embedded  Figures  Test,  a  nonlinguistic  measure  of  perceptual  disembedding 
(Witkin, 1950); the Reading the Mind in the Eyes Test, a measure of facial emotion recognition (Baron-Cohen et 
al., 2001a); and a suite of computer games developed in our laboratory (Yoder & Belmonte, 2010) in which are 
embedded  motivating,  ecologically  valid  tests  of  motion  coherence  perception,  behavioural  inhibition, 
behavioural sequencing and planing, spreading and shifting of visual spatial attention, perceptual disembedding, 
facial emotion recognition, and social perspective-taking.  This game format has been successfully applied both 
in studies of autism spectrum conditions and in studies of cognitive variation in normal young adults (Valla et al., 
2010).  Some of these tools need still to be adapted for the environment of South Asia, and validated against the 
original versions – for instance, tests of facial emotion need to incorporate facial images representative of South 
Asian ethnicities, facial emotional manifestations, and verbal emotional labels – but such adaptations are only a 
matter of time.  Clinical diagnoses on the autism spectrum now can be verified in an experimental subject's 
mother  tongue using  Western  Psychological  Services'  pre-publication  editions  of  the  Social  Communication 
Questionnaire (Rutter et al., 2003), a validated diagnostic instrument which has been translated (linguistically and 
culturally) into Hindi and Bengali, and which has been applied not only within the autism spectrum but also as a 
coarse, screening-level quantification of sub-diagnostic autistic traits in other populations (Kochhar et al., 2011). 
Although work remains to be done, cross-cultural comparisons within and beyond the autism spectrum have 
come within reach of practical experimental methods.
Assaying the biologically based liability separately from the culturally influenced outcome is a thornier 
question, but not an impossible one.  Although absolute measure of a biological variable is difficult with only 
behavioural methods, much information may be implicit in contrasts between experimental groups within and 
between cultures.  Absent undiscovered population-genetic interactions, it seems fairly safe to infer that wholly 
biologically determined behavioural outcomes would be invariant across cultures, whereas shifts in behavioural 
variables and in the the relationships between them could be attributed to interactions between cultural and 
biological biases.  Even the issue of population genetics could be controlled by using a contrast group consisting 
of  second-generation  immigrant  families  acculturated  within  Western  communities.   When  addressing  the 
question of autism spectrum conditions and the broader autism phenotype, typically developing individuals with 
no autism in the family can be used as a within-culture control sample, with differences in the autism-spectrum 
population expressed in  terms of  statistical  deviations  from population  norms for  that  culture  (Wakabayashi 
2007a, 2007b).  Some theoretically fractionable effects of culture may be difficult to separate, practically, from 
know effects of population variations – for instance, the potentiation of executive functions (Bialystok, 2010) and 
theory-of-mind (Kovács, 2009; Rubio-Fernández & Glucksberg, in press) that comes with early bilingualism, a 
condition  common  in  India,  especially  in  the  middle-class  urban  populations  that  are  most  accessible  to 
researchers, but rare in Britain and the United States.
Again, the major hypothesis is that lifelong exposure to a South Asian culture, focused on attention to 
context  and  on  social  interdependence,  may  constitute  an  implicit  behavioural  intervention  that  would  shift 
cognitive traits throughout the entire population distribution away from the autism spectrum.  This effect might 
be most evident and most potent in the social competence of individuals at the boundary of that spectrum, with 
Asperger  syndrome  and  the  broader  autism  phenotype.   So  one  would  predict  (1)  an  overall  increase  of 
empathising and perceptual construal level in South Asians in comparison to North Americans, and perhaps (2) 
an uncoupling of empathising from systemising in South Asians relative to North Americans, especially in the 
case of individuals with Asperger syndrome or mild autism-spectrum traits.  Furthermore, the more prescribed, 
even algorithmic nature of family and social relations in South Asia could support and scaffold social interaction 
in low empathisers: because both they and their social partners would have relatively well defined roles and 
scripts, the social system - and their social partners acting within that system - would be able to meet them more 
than halfway, as it were.  This phenomenon would predict (3) a heightening of the tendency in males with low 
empathising to “systemise empathy,” that is, within the sample of males who score low on overall measures of 
empathising traits and level of construal, the correlation between scores on overall measures of systemising traits 
and scores on specific measures of empathising would be increased.  Lastly, one could predict that (4) when the 
results are separated by sex, male and female population distribution curves would differ across cultures, with the 
male empathising curve being shifted rightwards in South Asians as an effect of social  scaffolding,  and the 
female curve being flattened with more individuals occupying its tails because of differential access to social 
scaffolding  in  the  context  of  prescribed  gender  roles.   It  remains  an  open  question  how  the  closeness  of 
correlation between dependent measures of perceptual level of construal on the one hand and social cognitive 
perspective-taking and other forms of psychological distance on the other may change across cultures, across 
genders, and across the interaction of these two independent variables.
Western  biomedical  research  –  and  Western  biomedical  researchers  –  could  benefit  from an  Indian 
sensibility, one that complements an analytical view of autism as a clinical disorder  separate from the rest of 
humanity with a more synthetic view of autism as essentially connected to human diversity.  Autistic cognitive 
traits,  in  moderation,  are  an essential  ingredient  in  human cognitive variation,  just  as  genes  associated with 
autism susceptibility are strewn throughout normal population genetics (Dutta et al., 2007; Guhathakurta et al., 
2008).   These  autistic  traits  interact  with  culturally  transmitted  cognitive  emphases  to  determine  cognitive 
outcomes.  Anecdotally, many parents who have migrated report that the family structures available in India are 
much more efficient at supporting their autistic children than are those available in the West.  By examining and 
documenting the effect of South Asian culture on cognition, both in autism-spectrum and non-autistic persons, 
the proposed research agenda would make a step towards codifying culturally transmitted wisdom, informing not 
only behavioural therapies for children with autism spectrum conditions but also best practices for developing 
every child's cognitive potential.  By understanding how each culture succeeds for some individuals on and off 
the autism spectrum, and also how each culture fails some individuals, social practices and therapeutic methods 
in all cultures can take a step forward towards better serving all members of the community.
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